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FOREWORD

TRADE, TERRORISM,

AND

ISLAM

JOEL A. NICHOLS*
How and why should countries promote trade? How should the world
prevent terrorism? How should we address the poverty and lack of basic
necessities facing many people in less-developed nations? What is the role
of religion (and specifically radical forms of Islam) in fostering terrorism?
How should we view the World Trade Organization’s Doha Development
Round, especially its byzantine provisions on agricultural subsidies, tariffs,
and the like? Should we promote adoption of the Doha Round?
These and other wide-ranging questions lie at the heart of the following trio of articles. In November 2011, Professor Raj Bhala delivered a
keynote address at the University of St. Thomas Law Journal’s Annual Law
Journal Lecture. That address was titled “The Doha Round as a Failed Instrument in Counter-Terrorism.” Professors Robert Delahunty and Frank
Garcia offered comments/responses to that lecture, and all three have now
memorialized their views in print for continued interaction and engagement.1 These papers—along with Professor Bhala’s other two parts of his
trilogy of articles on the Doha Round, Islam, and counter-terrorism2—provide a hearty start to a renewed debate about the Doha Development Round
and the possible linkage between free trade and counter-terrorism. Moreover, Bhala’s detailed analysis of the litany of trade provisions of the Doha
Round in his trilogy of articles is a crucially important addition to the literature in its own right.
* Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota), and Senior
Fellow, Emory University Center for the Study of Law and Religion. B.A., Abilene Christian
University (Texas), 1995; J.D. and M.Div., Emory University, 2000. Thanks to Raj Bhala, Robert
Delahunty, and Frank Garcia for their fine contributions to the literature. Thanks also to Marc
Spooner, Krista Griffith, T. J. Lang, Mae Beeler, and the editors and staff of the UST Law Journal
for their patience and hard work in bringing this volume to press.
1. See Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islamist Extremism, and the Debacle of Doha Round CounterTerrorism: Part One of a Trilogy—Agricultural Tariffs and Subsidies, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5
(2012); Robert J. Delahunty, Trade, War, and Terror: A Reply to Bhala, 9 U. ST. THOMAS. L.J.
161 (2012); Frank J. Garcia, Doha, Security, and Justice: A Response to Professor Raj. Bhala, 9
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 194 (2012).
2. See Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islamist Extremism, and the Debacle of Doha Round CounterTerrorism: Part Two of a Trilogy—Non-Agricultural Market Access and Services Trade, 44 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 325 (2011); Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islamist Extremism, and the Debacle of Doha
Round Counter-Terrorism: Part Three of a Trilogy—Trade Remedies and Facilitation, 40 DENV.
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 237 (2012).
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The central article that follows in this volume is that of Professor
Bhala. Bhala makes two major moves in his article. First, he sets the stage
for this and the other two articles in his trilogy by grappling with the Doha
Round as a failed instrument against terrorism. Second—and this comprises the bulk of the pages and notes in Bhala’s hefty work that follows—
he addresses the agricultural and commodity provisions of the Doha Round.
(In the other two articles of Bhala’s trilogy, he addresses other substantive
effects of trade in the Doha Round.)
Bhala states that the Members of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) recently articulated three alternative themes or rationales for the
Doha Round trade provisions—rather than relying upon their earlier ground
of anti-terrorism.3 Even raising such alternate themes is problematic, Bhala
believes, because it evinces a “loss of purpose” by the WTO Members and
evidences that they no longer “seek to use multilateral trade liberalization as
a counter-terrorist weapon.”4 Instead, Members have retreated to their own
“narrow agendas” and have “lost all sight of the common good”; the result,
Bhala fears, is a move away from development and away from counterterrorism and toward Members’ self-interest, which aligns with “Social
Darwinism as trade policy.”5 Bhala claims that, rightly understood, international trade law and the Doha Round can reduce poverty and advance development and thereby act as a central cog in a national security policy that
combats terrorism.6 This link between trade liberalization and poverty alleviation, which should lead to a reduction in Islamist extremism, was at the
forefront of launching the Doha Round in November 2001.7 But trade
negotiators “have lost sight of the theme”8 in the intervening years and have
instead resorted to ever-more complex rules that favor self-interest rather
than meeting the larger goal of poverty alleviation and fighting Islamist
extremism.
Having set the stage for the trilogy of articles with that thesis (which is
a lament of sorts), Professor Bhala next analyzes the December 2008 Draft
Modalities Texts along with the April 2011 Documents—specifically agricultural subsidies and tariffs. With his keen eye as a legal observer, Bhala
picks apart a host of textual provisions to illustrate how the Doha Round’s
goal of reducing agricultural subsidies, especially in rich countries, has not
yet been achieved because of parochial self-interest as well as the minutiae
of many provisions.9 Moreover, agricultural tariffs have fallen at a slower
pace than industrial tariffs because richer nations have protected their farm
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
rorism:
(2012).

Bhala, supra note 1, at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 29.
Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islamist Extremism, and the Debacle of Doha Round Counter-TerPart One of a Trilogy—Agricultural Tariffs and Subsidies, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5, 46
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sectors—and the Doha Round has failed to ameliorate agricultural tariffs
despite its intentions.10
In the end, Professor Bhala decries the turn taken by WTO DirectorGeneral Pascal Lamy and others, who proffer that the Doha Round should
be advanced as a fiscal stimulus package in these lean economic times.11
Not only will the Doha Round be ineffective in this regard, Bhala reasons,
but such a justification runs counter to the purpose of the Doha Round:
“[I]n the immediate post-9/11 environment, it was the nexus between trade
liberalization, alleviating poverty, and fighting extremism that galvanized
WTO members.”12 Bhala urges the reader—and WTO Members as well—
to conclude the Doha Round, even with all its technicalities and potential
short-comings, is a way to forge consensus among diverse interests and
combat poverty and terrorism at the same time.13
Professor Robert Delahunty’s following contribution engages the central tenet of Bhala’s trilogy—namely that poverty causes terrorism. Delahunty proffers that Bhala’s argument has “a highly respectable intellectual
pedigree” as a variation on the “peace through trade” argument that has
been advanced since the eighteenth century.14 Nonetheless, Delahunty believes that the specific variation offered by Bhala (of “counter-terrorism
through trade”) lacks support in the social science literature. Moreover,
Delahunty discounts that the danger of Islamist terrorism remains a grave
enough threat to merit adoption of the Doha Round if counter-terrorism
were its sole rationale, and he cites both empirical evidence and anecdotes
that run directly counter to the notion that poverty causes terrorism.15
Delahunty is not necessarily an opponent of the “free trade” ideas of
the Doha Round—but emphatically urges that they not be promoted on the
argument that free trade is a good counter-terrorism strategy. Not only is
Bhala “wrong” to promote it in this way, but “grounding the case for the
Doha Round on such an inadequate and unconvincing theory weakens the
argument for adopting [the Round].”16 Instead, Delahunty advocates that
free trade through the Doha Round should be “rooted instead in normative
arguments and in considerations of efficiency.”17
Professor Frank Garcia, in his contribution, slightly reframes Bhala’s
contentions by claiming that Bhala’s “argument is [fundamentally] that the
contemporary trading system is unjust and that this injustice matters on normative grounds and on security grounds.”18 Garcia builds upon this re10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 141–42.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 160.
Delahunty, supra note 1, at 162.
Id. at 184–85, 187–89.
Id. at 190.
Id.
Garcia, supra note 1, at 196.
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stated thesis by proffering a parallel thesis of his own: “[the] Doha [Round]
is about—or should have been about—remedying unjust trade patterns,
which . . . breed resentment and anger and thereby increase the potential for
violence.”19 The failure of the Doha Round, on this view, represents a historic failure to shift trade in the direction of increased support for development and a lost chance to further justice globally at a macro level.20
Professor Garcia also challenges readers to consider whether the stated
basis of the Doha Round (as preventing terrorism) was always merely a
political trope: “[A]s early as 2001, the WTO was seeking rhetorical justifications” for the Doha Round.21 The WTO sought such rhetorical justifications because its concerns were more about “resolv[ing] a political impasse
in the WTO in favor of wealthier states” than about the true promotion of
justice for the poor of the world.22 Garcia is not as melancholy as Bhala
about the turn toward other possible justifications for the Doha Round (such
as the now-proffered rationale of overcoming the economic crisis in the
midst of continuing uncertainty and austerity measures), for such publicly
stated rationales must always be tailored in some “political” way. This does
not lessen the need for liberalized trade, in Garcia’s view, for its ultimate
grounding centers upon justice and fairness. Garcia concludes the volume
with gratitude for Bhala’s reminder that “every trade agreement . . . is necessarily about poverty and justice.”23 He hopes that Bhala’s analysis and
writings spur WTO Members and readers to return to the core values of
remedying unjust trade patterns so that trade better reflects fairness as a
good in itself—which would also lead to the concomitant side-effect of reducing resentment, anger, and perhaps even violence.24
It is a common and worthy refrain among many organizations and individuals to alleviate poverty and establish more justice in the world. It is a
common longing and goal of nations to reduce terrorism and violent acts.
For the WTO to mutually advance such multiple broad goals through trade
mechanisms such as the Doha Round is asking quite a lot. The articles
herein make an important contribution to the public commentary about the
wisdom of concluding the Doha Round by taking head-on the question of
the connection between free trade, terrorism, and justice, as well as through
expounding the specific provisions on agricultural tariffs and subsidies.

19. Id. at 196–97.
20. Id. at 195.
21. Id. at 212.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Frank J. Garcia, Doha, Security, and Justice: A Response to Professor Raj Bhala, 9 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 194, 196 (2012).

